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ABSTRACT Traditionally, analytic philosophy of religion has focused almost solely on
specifically philosophical questions about religion. These include the existence of God and
divine attributes, religious language, and the justification of religious beliefs, just to mention a
few. Recently, many scholars in the field have begun to engage more directly with scientific
results. We suggest that this is a promising direction for philosophy of religion to take.
Nevertheless, we want to warn philosophy of religion against the excessive focus on meth-
odology that has preoccupied the “science and religion dialogue” in theology. Instead of
attempting to formulate a general methodology for all possible engagements between phi-
losophy of religion and the sciences, philosophers of religion would do well to focus on local
and particular themes. Since there is no single method in philosophy and since scientific
disciplines that have religious relevance vary in their methods as well, progress can be made
only if philosophical tools are employed to analyse particular and clearly demarcated
questions.
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S ince the 1950s, analytic philosophy of religion has focusedalmost solely on distinctly philosophical questions related toreligion and theology. These include (but are not limited to)
questions about religious language, arguments for the existence
and non-existence of God and the concept of God. In the 1980s,
philosophy of religion saw a renaissance when new and more
diverse views of epistemology and metaphysics stirred up the
field. Although some philosophers of religion have engaged with
scientific results, usually either supporting of undermining theism
(e.g., Swinburne, 2004), it is clear that the methods and the
questions have been distinctly “philosophical” rather than sci-
entific. In the meantime, analytic philosophy as a whole has been
strongly shaped not only by methodological naturalism, where
philosophy seeks to model itself after the sciences, but also by the
increasing motivation to take into account the results of the
sciences in philosophical work (Kornblith, 2016). The scientific
turn in philosophy of mind and cognition is a good example of
this. Following this general trend, philosophers of religion have
begun to engage with the results of the sciences more and more
(e.g., Plantinga, 2011; Nagasawa, 2012). It is perhaps misleading
to talk about “a scientific turn” in the philosophy of religion:
methodologically philosophy of religion has not become more
scientific, nor are there many voices demanding that. Never-
theless, philosophers have begun to take scientific results into
account in debates that have traditionally been conducted in
philosophical terms only.
Generally speaking, we find this turn towards increasing
engagement with the sciences a positive one. Not only does it
make philosophy of religion more pluralistic and interdisciplinary,
but it also injects the stale debates with new ideas and perspectives.
We also want to maintain the “philosophical” nature of philoso-
phy of religion: it cannot be turned or transformed into a science
to supplement or replace the scientific study of religion.
In this article, we want to address two interconnected issues.
The first has to do with the methods of engagement between the
sciences and philosophy of religion. We will provide some
methodological reflections on how this engagement with the
sciences has been done and how it could be done better. By
drawing lessons from theology, especially the “science and reli-
gion dialogue”, we suggest that philosophers of religion should
not commit themselves to one, single method of engagement or
enforce one methodological stance for all such engagements. We
refer here especially to a number of scholars who have attempted
to develop a post-foundationalist methodology for all such
engagements. As far as we understand it, postfoundationalists
have two goals. On the one hand, they seek rehabilitate theology
as an academic enterprise; on the other hand, they seek to resist
scientistic or reductionistic views of the sciences as a whole (e.g.,
Van Huyssteen, 2006).
Although we suggest that lessons can be learned from “religion
and science”, we do not want to press the analogy too far. It is
clear that philosophy of religion and “science and religion” dia-
logue are not completely analogous. The scope of the analogy
obviously depends on how we understand, among other things,
the nature of “science” and to what extent theology or philosophy
of religion might be understood as faith-based or apologetic
enterprises. Nevertheless, there is enough similarity between the
cases that warrant the analogy for our purposes. The second part
of the article highlight some topics where philosophers of religion
have, we suggest, successfully taken into account or responded to
scientific work thus contributing to the interdisciplinary discus-
sion. We will conclude the article with reflections on future topics
and questions, and some suggested modes of engagement.
Before going any further, we want to note the following. It is
not our aim to offer a programmatic discussion of the nature of
philosophy of religion as a whole, since this is beyond the scope of
this article. Instead, we outline a way of understanding how the
engagements between science, philosophy and religion could be
conducted more efficiently; an apologia for a pluralistic metho-
dological approach, one might say. Regarding the specific
examples of some topics briefly mentioned along the way, we do
not aim to break new ground.
What does philosophy of religion have to do with the
sciences?
Philosophers of religion have many different motives for engaging
the sciences. The most salient one has, of course, been the impact
that the sciences might have for the theism/atheism debate. We
call this the “apologetic motive”. On the atheist side, there are
arguments suggesting that some large-scale scientific results, say,
from evolutionary biology and cosmology, undermine theism in
some way or another. According to a very popular argument,
Darwinist evolutionary biology undermines those arguments for
the existence of God that are based on biological design. Some
have even suggested that evolutionary biology undermines all
aspects of theism (e.g., Dawkins, 2006). However, it is not only
the results of the sciences that are relevant in this context. Rather,
the progress and trustworthiness of the sciences has also raised
epistemological challenges to the rationality of religious beliefs
and commitments. The Dutch philosopher Herman Philipse,
(2012) is a good example of a philosopher who employs both
strategies. First, he argues that the ways in which religious beliefs
are formed (claims about revelations, testimony, etc.) are in fact
much less reliable than scientific ones. For this reason, one should
take scientific results as having superior authority over less reli-
ably produced religious beliefs. Second, he argues that all argu-
ments for the existence of God, gods and supernatural beings fail,
be they empirical or conceptual.
The theist side of the debate has attempted to defuse the sci-
entific challenge to theism in different ways. One well-known
response is to adopt scientific-style reasoning in defence of the-
ism, like Richard Swinburne, (2004) has sought to do for decades.
According to Swinburne, metaphysical claims, such as the exis-
tence of God, can be established with some probability by
invoking a large spectrum of empirical evidence. These include
the existence and general features of our world, certain historical
events and religious experiences. The theistic hypothesis,
according to Swinburne, explains this evidence better than the
naturalistic one. Another response comes from the so called
Reformed Epistemology that seeks to defuse the epistemic chal-
lenge from science by defending a different kind of epistemology
altogether. But this is all familiar territory to those in the field of
philosophy of religion.
Although it is somewhat narrow, we find nothing wrong in
principle with the apologetic motivation. One function of philo-
sophy of religion is to make the reasons behind and the structure
inherent in religious and non-religious worldviews as clear and
transparent as possible. Moreover, it is a value for civic discourse
to be based on views that are publicly and properly managed
(Gutting, 2016). In what follows, we, nevertheless, want to look
beyond the apologetic motive and seek wider forms of engage-
ment between the sciences and philosophy of religion. Now, the
question is what these engagements could look like. Here we
might take our cue from philosopher Alvin Goldman, (1992),
who is known for his work at the boundary of epistemology and
the cognitive sciences. According to Goldman, there are at least
three separate ways in which philosophers have engaged with the
cognitive sciences.
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First, the traffic can be from philosophy to some other dis-
cipline. Cognitive science is a field where philosophers have made
significant contributions to empirical work. Philosophical con-
tributions to the field include theories, models and hypotheses,
but especially philosophical tools. As is well known, different
systems of logic, probabilistic reasoning and semantic theories of
philosophy are now widely employed in cognitive linguistics and
artificial intelligence studies, for instance. Philosophical theories
concerning the mind-body problem and consciousness, for
instance, now have a life of their own in different fields of the
cognitive sciences. As far as we see it, philosophers of religion
have had very little engagement of this kind with the sciences in
the last century or so. Philosophers of religion very seldom
contribute anything to the sciences themselves. However, we will
suggest later that this does not necessarily need to be so. Perhaps
philosophers of religion could contribute to the sciences by
providing claims and perhaps even theories that could be tested
and assessed in the scientific study of religion or even experi-
mental philosophy.
In the second form of engagement, philosophers can bring
insights from philosophy of science, analyse background
assumptions and metaphysical commitments of different theories.
By assuming this role, the philosopher clarifies critical concepts
thereby contributing to possible novel empirical questions and
theoretical innovation in the target field. We think this kind of
engagement could also include the interpretation of scientific
results: what kinds of conclusions can be drawn from them given
their methodological assumptions? This, we suggest, can also
include engaging with popular science material, since oftentimes
the most important interpretations of scientific results appear in
popularised works rather than in scientific papers themselves.
This form of engagement has been more popular among phi-
losophers of religion. They have debated interpretations of the
aforementioned evolutionary biology and physical cosmology, for
instance (Holder, 2004). However, more positive contributions
via methodological criticism and analysis have been surprisingly
rare. We think that there could be multiple scientific fields where
philosophers of religion could make a distinctive contribution.
The authors of this paper have worked on the scientific study of
religion (Visala, 2011), interdisciplinary models of human nature,
and the psychology of disagreement (Vainio, 2017) just to men-
tion a few.
The most natural domain for the philosophers of religion to
engage in this way would be religious studies and the scientific
study of religion. Various approaches in the study of religion have
their own distinctive philosophical questions that have over-
lapped somewhat with philosophy of religion. These include,
among other things, the concept of “religion” itself. Questions
have been raised whether “religion” is a helpful scientific category
at all; perhaps “tradition” or “practice” would be more accurate.
Against this, one could maintain that “religion” still has prag-
matic value in the study of religion: it is useful to have a general
definition of religion but one must at the same time remember
that it might not work in all cases (Nongbri, 2013).
Coming back to Goldman, there is a third way in which he sees
the relationship of philosophy and the sciences playing out.
Instead of contributing to the cognitive sciences, philosophers can
apply the results and theories from this field to reformulate or
answer philosophical problems. When philosophers of religion
have engaged the sciences in this way, the motivation has mainly
been apologetic, but it need not be so. Philosophers of religion
should use a wide variety of scientific results, since their own
interests span from moral and religious knowledge to meta-
physics. This variety of interest beyond the apologetic motivation
can be seen in a recent edited volume on scientific approaches to
philosophy of religion (Nagasawa, 2012). Essays in the volume
cover many different topics and seek to employ theories from the
natural and behavioural sciences to problems in philosophy of
religion. There are essays on psychology of counterfactual
thinking, multiverse cosmology, the cognition of religious dis-
agreement, as well as the psychology of character formation and
responsibility.
In philosophy of religion, there has been a long-standing
debate on what role naturalistic explanations of religion have in
the atheism vs. theism debate. It is clear that simply offering a
naturalistic explanation of belief in God or gods does not show
that these beliefs are false. Nevertheless, such explanations might
cast doubt upon religious claims in some other way. In the cur-
rent scene, these issues are discussed in the context of so called
debunking arguments of ethics, morality and religion. The main
issue here is whether the epistemic status of our value-beliefs,
moral beliefs and religious beliefs changes after we take into
account evolutionary and cognitive explanations of these beliefs.
We will return to this issue in more detail later.
What can philosophers learn from the science and religion
dialogue?
The question is how exactly philosophers of religion should
engage with the sciences. In what follows, we want to suggest that
we need not enforce one single methodology for such engage-
ments. Here we want to draw a specific lesson from theology,
where the “science and religion dialogue” has been going on for
some time now. It seems that many theological post-
foundationalists have attempted to formulate an overarching
methodology for theology and science engagements. Against this,
we want to suggest that philosophers of religion can proceed
successfully without strongly committing themselves to some
overarching methodological stance. Philosophers of religion
should be pluralists: engagements between philosophy and the
sciences should be conducted more “locally” than “globally” and
taking into account the diverse interests of those actually involved
in the engagement. Something similar is also acknowledged in
general philosophical methodology, so our argument does not
constitute any kind of special pleading (Cappelen, 2017).
The best way to approach the “science and religion dialogue” is
to look at its aims. After four or five decades of intense research
and branching out towards various scientific disciplines, it seems
that the “dialogue” has not really achieved its aims as they were
originally conceived. Although the dialogue began in the 1970s in
the English-speaking world, mainly in the UK, it has since been
taken up in continental Europe, as well as in the US. The dialogue
was originally an attempt to form a workable theological position
between two extremes: science inspired naturalism that rejects
central theological claims (the existence of God and the possibility
of revelation, for instance) and entails a large-scale conflict
between science and theology, and creationism or various forms
of intelligent design theory that reject the validity of large parts of
contemporary science, especially biology. Furthermore, this view
was supposed to be disseminated amongst both scientists and
theologians: from now on, both could work together in solving
the great mysteries of life and cosmos. So, the aim was to make
both academic theology and actual religious communities adopt a
more positive attitude towards the sciences and to convince the
sceptical scientists to adopt a friendlier attitude towards religion
and theology. Early on, scientist/theologians such as John Polk-
inghorne, Arthur Peacocke and Ian Barbour, (1998), among
others, argued for a deep compatibility between scientific and
theological worldviews.
The field has enjoyed steady growth since the early days and it
has established itself as a kind of sub-discipline of theology. The
enquiry so far has produced constructive theological proposals
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that seek to integrate scientific insights into theology (e.g., Pea-
cocke 2004). Several journals (Zygon, Theology and Science),
institutions (Ian Ramsey Centre in Oxford, the Zygon Centre for
Religion and Science in Chicago), professor’s chairs and lecture-
ships (Oxford, Cambridge, Princeton Theological Seminary,
Boston University) and societies (International Society for Science
and Religion, for instance) have emerged to support and structure
the research in the field. The intellectual development of the field
is summarised in numerous textbooks and handbooks published
in the last few years (e.g., Clayton and Simpson, 2006).
Regardless of the steady growth of the field both academically
and intellectually, there are dissenting voices. Philosopher Willem
Drees’ analysis is dim: “Despite much activity, however, con-
sensus on issues of importance seems far away, the impact on
theology and on religious communities is limited and the aca-
demic credibility of ‘religion and science’ is marginal.” (2009).
Apart from occasional knee-jerks towards biological evolution,
Western theology, for the most part, has proceeded without
taking into account what the sciences say about important
theological issues, such as the nature of human beings. The same
is true of actual religious communities, which oftentimes exhibit a
hostile attitude towards science. Finally, the science and theology
dialogue has had very little impact on the academia at large.
It is surprising to note that there are very few critical assess-
ments of the science and theology dialogue from the theological
side. Most textbooks and handbooks only mention the rapid
development of the field but do not provide a general assessment
as to whether the field has achieved its goals. So far, many have
turned to postfoundationalism as methodological tool to achieve
the original goals set for the debate (e.g., Van Huyssteen, 2006;
Marshall, 2002). The underlying assumption was that if the right
method were to be found, the dialogue would subsequently sort
itself out.
However, it is clear that the science and religion dialogue has
not achieved methodological unity or consensus. According to
Drees, (2009), the failure to reach the original aims stems from
the fragmentation endemic to the field. The fragmentation is
most likely produced by the mutually exclusive philosophical
assumptions and interests of the participants: most participants
operate on the basis of their own (and mutually incompatible)
religious (or non-religious) assumptions and, thus, understand
the nature of science, religion and theology differently than
others. Some might be critical of the sciences and unwilling to
modify their theologies, whereas others are willing to make large-
scale theological revisions to accommodate even the most thor-
oughgoing versions of scientific naturalism. Another methodo-
logical issue is the analytic-continental divide: the area is torn
between continental style theology and postmodern philosophy in
Europe and more analytically and science-oriented approaches in
the English-speaking world.
Although we do not see much progress in the distinctly
theological part of the dialogue, other parts of the discipline have
progressed well. Here we have in mind the research conducted
into the history of the relationship between religions and the
sciences. Indeed, the work done here has successfully debunked
the very popular conflict narrative or conflict myth of science and
religion (Numbers, 2009). Significant work has been done on the
Galileo case, the birth of the scientific method in the late medieval
and renaissance Europe, as well as the 19th century debates on
Darwinism just to mention a few topics (Harrison, 1998, 2015;
Brooke, 1991).
We can draw an important moral from this: when the science
and religion dialogue has made progress, the progress has come
about through scholars working on methods they know well (in
this case historical ones) and focusing on specific claims (the
conflict myth, for instance). We think that this should be also the
model for the future of scholarship. Instead of formulating the
supposedly correct overall method for the engagement, like the
postfoundationalists suggest, scholars should localise their
approach and concentrate, for example, on particular instances
where scientific theories or results seem to be relevant to religious
views and use the methods that seem to be appropriate for this
specific task.
The debate about debunking
We now move from the methodological discussion towards the
topical. More specifically, we want to highlight one area where
philosophers of religion have successfully engaged with ethicists,
epistemologists and scientists. This is the debate about psycho-
logical or evolutionary debunking arguments. Given the progress
of offering evolutionary and cognitive accounts of the emergence
of moral and religious beliefs, there have been suggestions that
such accounts undermine the rationality or justification of such
beliefs or preclude moral and religious knowledge altogether. This
debate, we suggest, is a point where philosophers of religion can
engage with the sciences in all aforementioned ways. First, they
can provide hypotheses to be tested by the scientists (could there
be a specific cognitive mechanism for religious experiences, for
instance). Second, they can engage in methodological analysis and
clarification of the work in cognitive science and evolutionary
biology. Finally, they can use the results in multiple ways: assess
whether they are relevant for the theism/atheism debate and
rework their ideas about religious or moral epistemology, just to
mention a few.
What are evolutionary debunking arguments? The discussion
has heated up as a result of the increasingly detailed evolutionary
and cognitive explanations of our value-beliefs, moral beliefs
(Joyce, 2003; Griffiths and Wilkins, 2013) and god-beliefs (Leech
and Visala, 2011). Debunking arguments can be aimed at
undermining the truth of these beliefs or the basis of which we
come to believe them. Consider god-beliefs and the archaeologist
Steven Mithen, for example. According to Mithen, religion is a
human universal: it can be found in almost all cultures and
societies. This fact, he continues, can be explained by positing the
existence of a supernatural realm where gods reside or by pro-
viding evidence that the human mind itself creates these ideas
about the supernatural. Mithen goes for the latter solution, since
the “on-going activity of the universe and life are explained by
entirely natural processes”. He concludes that
Religious thought is uniquely associated with Homo sapiens
and arose as a consequence of cognitive fluidity, which was
in turn a consequence of the origin of language. In this
regard, there appears to be no need to invoke a moment of
divine intervention that initiated the start of a revelation.
For me, therefore, there is no supernatural, no God to be
revealed. (Mithen, 2009)
As far as we see it, the argument can be characterised as fol-
lows. The fact that there is a plausible naturalistic explanation for
the emergence of belief in gods, demonstrates that god-beliefs
(and supernatural belief in general) is false. To be more precise,
the deductive version of the argument would be this:
1. If there is a complete or sufficiently complete causal
explanation of how belief in God came about and this
explanation does not include God as a causal factor, then
there is no God.
2. Current cognitive and evolutionary accounts of religion
provide a complete or sufficiently complete causal explanation
of this kind and they do not include God as a causal factor.
3. Therefore, there is no God.
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Such an argument has a number of problems. First, there seems
to be very little reason to accept 1. The falsity of god-beliefs
cannot be inferred from the fact that there exists a causal
explanation why people have god-beliefs that does not mention
any god. This would commit the genetic fallacy. By exposing the
causal history of a belief says nothing about the truth of the belief.
This is because the truth (or falsity) of a proposition has no
necessary relationship to the causes that led people to believe it.
For such reasons, philosophers of all stripes consider such
inferences as invalid.
Furthermore, premise 2 is also vulnerable to critique. One
could point out that we do not as of yet know whether the sci-
entific theories of religion we now have will withstand the test of
time. Or one could grant that perhaps the cognitive and evolu-
tionary factors that current theories invoke to explain religion are
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of
religion (or at least we do not know that they are). Thus, it seems
that we do not have enough reasons to exclude the possibility of
other causal factors being involved (Visala, 2011).
Given the aforementioned points, it seems to us that debunking
arguments aimed at the truth of god-beliefs or perhaps even
moral beliefs are not very plausible. However, debunking argu-
ments usually target the grounding of a belief rather than its
truth. In this case, they seek to undermine the rationality, justi-
fication or otherwise cast doubt upon the belief on the basis of
how it is generated. Philosopher Guy Kahane, (2011) provides a
schematic version of the argument:
● S’s belief that p is explained by X.
● X is a process that does not track the truth of p.
● Therefore, S’s belief that p is not justified.
It is not difficult to adapt this schema for our purposes.
4. Susan’s belief that there is a God is explained by her
unconscious cognitive mechanisms.
5. These cognitive mechanisms are not truth-tracking with
respect to the existence or non-existence of God.
6. Therefore, Susan’s belief that there is a God is not justified.
There is a considerable body of work dealing with debunking
arguments of this kind (e.g.,Visala, 2014; Jong and Visala, 2014;
Leech and Visala, 2012; Clark and Rabinowitz, 2011; Schloss and
Murray, 2009; Trigg and Barrett, 2014; De Cruz and de Smedt,
2014; Vainio, 2016). Let us simply mention some counter stra-
tegies that have emerged in the literature to block the afore-
mentioned argument.
First, premise 4 suffers from the same problems as premise 1
above. So, it seems that any given individual’s belief in God is
underdetermined by her intuitive cognitive mechanisms. If this is
the case, then even if we could eventually get a full description of
a person’s intuitive cognitive mechanisms and demonstrate that
such mechanisms are unreliable sources of god-beliefs, we could
not conclude that god-beliefs were unwarranted. They could be
justified on some other grounds.
Second, premise 5 looks much more plausible and defensible.
One defence would be as follows. It could be argued, for instance,
that a causal connection of a certain kind has to connect a belief
and its target for the belief to be justified. An argument could be
made that such a link might not exist in the case of theism: the
best explanation on offer seems to suggest that if God did not
exist, people might be theists anyway. One cognitive mechanisms
singled out for its unreliability is the postulated (hyper)sensitive
agency detection device (Barrett, 2011). This system responds to
clues of agency and purposeful action in perceptual input. The
suggestion is that human agency detection is oversensitive or
hypersensitive: it overextends agency where there is none (natural
occurrences, luck, misfortune, etc.). In addition to being over-
sensitive, agency detection is unreliable in other ways as well. The
god-beliefs it generates or supports are extremely diverse and
mutually incompatible: the religious worlds are populated by
various gods, spirits, ghosts and other non-natural agencies. This
diversity demonstrates that human agency detection is unreliable.
There have been a number of responses to such arguments.
Philosopher Michael Murray (2009) and others have maintained
that the unreliability of agency detection is difficult to prove
without assuming the truth of atheism. The bottom line is that,
for the most part, our agency detection successfully detects actual
agency. We identify other humans, animals and their various
kinds of intentions very reliably. Without assuming atheism,
there seems to be nothing in the cognitive science account of
agency detection that would rule out the possibility of genuine
agency detection in a religious context as well.
As for the link between unreliability and diversity, Murray has
tried to respond to this as well. He suggests that the diversity
might be a product of the cultural context where the outputs of
the agency detection system are interpreted rather than the sys-
tem itself. Thus, the outputs of the agency detection system would
be stable across cultures and therefore reliable, although their
cultural elaborations would change from context to context. One
might respond to Murray here by introducing an epistemological
worry: how do we know what the “real” outputs of agency
detection system are, since they are always interpreted in some
cultural context? Is not the fact that the outputs can be inter-
preted differently itself a signal of the unreliability of the
mechanism? As such responses demonstrate, it is far from clear
that the problem of religious diversity has been solved. The dis-
cussion on debunking arguments is likely to continue.
Future issues
Lastly, we wish to briefly highlight some promising fields of
enquiry where philosophy of religion and other sciences can meet
and produce something beneficial, not only for academic spe-
cialists but for the public. These topics include free will, virtues,
religion and violence and cosmology.
Free will and moral responsibility. Philosophers of religion are
interested in free will for a variety of reasons. Notions of free will
and responsibility are central to many religious doctrines,
including incarnation, sin, grace and salvation. In addition, free
will is crucial in debates about personhood of both God and
human beings. Finally, free will has do with philosophical and
theological views of moral cognition and virtue. Despite the fact
that Christian theologians disagree about free will to some extent,
they nevertheless maintain that humans are moral agents, who
are accountable for their actions in front of God and one another.
Interestingly, some cognitive scientists and neuroscientists have
been sceptical of free will. Inspired by the 1980s studies of
neuroscientist Benjamin Libet, psychologist Daniel Wegner,
(2002) argues that free will is an illusion. According to Wegner,
conscious decisions are not involved in the production of human
actions. Instead, underlying neural mechanisms cause both
actions and feelings of conscious decision-making. In other
words, our conscious “decisions” are more like rationalisations
that attempt to retroactively make rational the actions caused by
subconscious, non-rational mechanisms.
These claims sparked an enormous philosophical and scientific
debate (e.g., Baer and Kaufman and Baumeister, 2008).
Philosophers of religion could engage with this debate in a
variety of ways. They could highlight, among other critics of
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0190-9 ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |           (2018) 4:135 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0190-9 | www.nature.com/palcomms 5
Wegner and others, that a very limited notion of free will is being
assumed here. It is assumed that an action must be immediately
preceded by a conscious decision in order to be free. Against this,
philosophers of religion could maintain that our moral
responsibility practices are rather diverse and varied: it seems
that people can be held responsible for actions that are not
immediately preceded by conscious decisions.
Freedom and moral responsibility are fruitful areas of
discussion, because of the probability of new neuroscientific
and cognitive science results in the near future. The study of
cognitive and neural processes of decision-making is progressing
quite rapidly. The engagement need not take the form of
opposing the sceptical conclusion. It can also channel the results
of this research into philosophy of religion. In terms of human
decision-making and moral cognition, there is an important
lesson to be learned here: human moral decisions and choices are
not always as deliberate and conscious as humans might like to
think. Most of our cognitive mechanisms work automatically
without our conscious awareness. And, like breathing, we do not
consciously decide to do most of the things that we do.
Virtues and moral character. Ever since Plato and Aristotle, we
have asked whether and how teaching and learning virtues might
be possible. Recent advances in moral psychology have provided
some empirical studies that demonstrate how stable our char-
acters are and how they might be influenced, for good or for
worse (Miller, 2014; Peterson and Seligman, 2004). The current
state of the art seems to suggest that we humans are bundles of
various habits some of which are good while some bad. None of
us is simply virtuous or vicious, but we can excel in some areas
while failing in many others. Nonetheless, our characters appear
to be relatively stable, and also subject to behavioural improve-
ment or degeneration.
As we come to understand how the human mind works more
and more, this raises important philosophical and religious
questions, which are not, as such, answerable by the sciences
alone. What are virtues we should teach to our citizens? What is
the best way to do so? The received answer is that we need small-
scale institutions, like families and clubs, that are best suited for
cultivating virtuous behaviour (Adams, 2006). However, these
theories can and should be tested in the future. The current
escalated culture war and campus meltdowns in USA make these
questions all the more important.
How should we view moral failures and responsibility given
what we know about the weakness and malleability of the human
mind? Why some forms of action that appear virtuous, can be in
fact vicious (Tosi and Warmke, 2016)? These are likewise timely
and practical questions, which incidentally were thoroughly
investigated by patristic and medieval authors (Saarinen, 1994).
Contemporary authors have not so far engaged these works in
constructive manner.
Religion, tolerance and violence. The acts of terror perpetrated
in the name of Islam have produced a burgeoning field of study
since 9/11. While we still may hear simplistic accusation about
the relationship of religiosity and violent or extremist behaviour,
there is ample amount of material that uses philosophical clarity
to address this relationship in detail. For example, philosophical
tools, social sciences, anthropology, psychology and history have
been used to successfully argue for the complexity of this rela-
tionship (Atran, 2010, Clarke, 2014, Clarke et al. 2013, Vainio,
2017). While there are situations where religious behaviour and
violence seem to correlate, it is simply not warranted to claim that
religiosity per se causes violence more than general human
“groupish” or group-oriented behaviour.
The existing issues concern, among other things, the definition
of religion, harm and tolerance. In multicultural Western societies,
we face more and more questions about religious freedom and
religious recognition. Answering these questions requires inter-
disciplinary work, where philosophy of religion should play
important role. Obviously, the question concerning the freedom of
religion or freedom of conscience cannot be answered without
having well-defined concepts of religion, freedom and conscience
that are agreed upon by the disputants. In USA, there is an
ongoing discussion whether “freedom of worship” is the same
thing as “freedom of religion”. It seems that this redefinition
restricts the meaning of religion so that special freedom would be
applicable to the places and moments of “worship” and not to
public life. This, however, enforces a very narrow definition what
religious convictions are and what they entail.
But granting the freedom of religion creates new issues, such as
how should individuals and institutions encounter and foster
multiple religious, or ideological, identities within the same public
space. Since the Enlightenment, we have been familiar with the
attitude of toleration, but now many argue that this are not
enough. Instead of toleration, we should aim for acknowl-
edgement and recognition. Since these demands come from
political philosophy, they function quite well with national and
racial identities, but run into problems in cases where there are
ideological convictions involved, be they secular or religious. The
practical question is what we can reasonably demand from people
when we know how political, moral and religious convictions are
formed and sustained (Vainio and Visala, 2016).
Cosmology and human existence. Several scientists have recently
popularised their work in the form of popular science books,
which also delve into questions that are not inherently scientific.
Effectively, many scientists use their authority as scientists to
engage philosophical or theological questions (Krauss, 2012;
Vilenkin, 2006). Some such claims have been subjected to criti-
cism not only by theists but also atheists (Nagel, 2010). We think
that this is important task for philosophers of religion to
undertake simply because it is not good for the public discourse
to be based on highly contested or even blatantly false views.
Philosophy of religion has traditionally discussed the meaning
of Big Bang-cosmology and whether it supports, for example,
Kalam cosmological argument (Craig and Sinclair, 2012). Recent
ongoing discussion concerns multiverse cosmologies and their
effects on religious views (Holder, 2004). An example of a
cosmological question, which is not directly religious but it has
religious relevance, is the issue of human cosmic significance
(Kahane, 2014; Mulgan, 2015). Briefly put, how should we
construe human significance and value when we know that the
universe is mind-bogglingly huge and we are just vanishing bits of
dust in the midst of endless empty space?
A further question concerns the possibility of objective moral
value in our almost incomprehensibly large cosmos. While
philosophers of religion have focused on arguing for theism as the
source of objective value, there has been an emergence of various
non-naturalistic positions that acknowledge the value theistic
considerations and arguments while rejecting theism (Wielen-
berg, 2014). While non-naturalist options in metaethics have
become more popular in philosophy, this quite likely means more
work and visibility for philosophers of religion who have for long
wrestled with these questions (Cuneo, 2016).
Conclusion
We have suggested a modest methodological pluralism in philo-
sophy of religion, when it engages the sciences. Since there is no
single methodology in philosophy and there are various scientific
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methodologies depending on the subject matter, there cannot be
just one monolithic method that could be used to solve the issues in
the interface of science and philosophy. The methods and questions
are determined ad hoc and based on the nature of the issue at hand.
It is, of course, possible and even hoped for that philosophers of
religion provide contextual methodologies that define how philo-
sophical tools are to be used in a specified context. One such
example is the analytic theology project that investigates the rea-
sonability of theological doctrines and attempts to find new ways to
formulate them with analytic tools (Arcadi, 2017).
Meanwhile, we propose that the enquiry should pay attention
to a broad range of epistemic virtues, such as transparency,
honesty and all the other virtues necessary for critical thinking,
which should guide the scholars as they go about thinking these
issues. While there is some disagreement concerning the ultimate
goals of philosophy in general and philosophy of religion in
particular, we believe that virtually everyone thinks that these
goals include, even if they are not exhausted by, rational and
public enquiry of fundamental questions of being and existence,
providing arguments and counter-arguments to pre-theoretical
convictions and assessing strengths and weaknesses of various
claims that are relevant to our worldview (Gutting, 2016). We
cannot see how meaningful public discussion about these matters
could take place without the perspectives provided by philoso-
phers of religion.
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